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Where Have All The Young Girls
Gone?
Fatal Discrimination of Daughters—A Regional Comparison
Marina Thorborg
1 Hong Kong in 1972. A picture in the South China Morning Post shows a crying mother
surrounded by all her daughters. Her only son has disappeared, maybe kidnapped. A
caption under the photograph cites what the weeping woman is saying: “I would give
all my daughters away if only I can get my son back”. This type of situation and similar
reactions  were  frequently  reported  in  this  and  other  papers  in  Hong  Kong  during
1972-1973.
2 My first  reaction was,  how are the daughters reacting to this?  Were they not hurt
knowing they were worth only a fraction of another child? According to the newspaper
reports the young girls just sat there during the interview and display signs of being
upset  only  for  the  loss  of  a  sibling.  Was  the  old  Chinese  saying,  “better  to  have  a
crippled son than eight healthy daughters” still valid for their mother, family, and kin?
And in that case why?
3 Apparently this is still the case today as new data reveal how would-be daughters in not
only China but also in other Chinese societies and in South Asia are aborted in their
millions as foetuses because of their sex. Already in 1990 it was estimated by the later
Economy Nobel  prize  laureate  Amartya Sen that  one hundred million women were
“missing” in the world, most of them concentrated to South Asia and China1. So many
young girls have already been eliminated that it is showing in the demographics of the
youth in these populations2. International and Chinese media have devoted a number of
reports to the plight of the “surplus” of fifty million young men who cannot find a wife,
while mainly women’s organisations have asked the crucial question, “Why has fatal
discrimination of daughters returned to China?”3. 
4 How much a society values its women and particularly its young females is revealed
more by demographic data, than by self-congratulatory speeches on Women’s Day or
any number of enlightened laws promulgated but never really implemented4. If half the
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population, the female half, is decimated, or left markedly behind, this clearly shows
the real value society accords to women5. 
5 If a society continues to build its welfare system and particularly its old age care on the
conception  of  the  special  responsibility  of  a  son,  this  might  be  directly  inviting
discrimination against daughters and according them a lesser value. Hence how old-age
support is organised might be more a crucial factor for the survival of female foetuses,
young daughters and women, than rigidly enforced birth planning per se. This is what
this article will look into, by comparing China with other societies in the region that do
not have forced family planning and some of them more affluent.
6 Demographic data do not only reveal sex discrimination in the immediate past but also
show the cumulative impact of prolonged differential treatment according to gender.
New research is  showing  that  there  is  no  one  straightforward  connection  between
economic  modernisation per  se and higher  value  accorded to  women or  any other
disadvantaged group for that matter6. 
7 Another  assumption  was  that  rapid  development  and  economic  growth  contribute
somehow  automatically  more  to  gender  equality  than  a  slower  tempo.  But  recent
research has proved it to be rather the other way around7.
Demographic sources
8 National  differences  in  definitions,  concepts,  procedures  in  data  collection  and
estimation  methods  limit  the  comparability  of  demographic  data  for  international
comparisons; but they can be used for indicating trends. In developing countries lack of
communications  further  adds  to  the  difficulties:  the  ease  with  which  data  can  be
obtained also influence their quality8, especially when relating to such huge countries
as China and India9. The level of trust towards authorities in a society also contributes
to the quality of the information obtained10.
9 There always exists a multitude of reasons for concealing data from authorities such as
avoiding taxes, military service, restrictions on births, or prolongation of benefits11.
Infant and child mortality rates in a comparative setting
10 Infant mortality refers to the age group of zero to one year old and child mortality to
the age group of one to five years. Some composite, demographic data usually carry
more national prestige than others, such as infant mortality rates, as this has usually
been hailed as a sign of how far a country has developed with regard to social progress.
How fast a country manages to decrease the mortality of its most vulnerable group, the
infants, informs us as well how it treats and values their mothers12. After 1960, Taiwan,
Hong Kong and Singapore  closely  follow Japan in  the  rapid  reduction of  its  infant
mortality in line with a general economic upsurge (see Table 1).
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11 In China after 1949 peace contributed to decreased mortality rates. However, a famine
in 1954 and the devastating Great Leap famine in 1959-1961—claiming from 43 to 60
million  lives—created  peaks  of  infant  mortality  at  pre-war  levels13.  However,  the
positive  trends,  which  began  in  the  1950s  resumed  with  increased  welfare  in  the
mid-1960s  whereby  China  made  rapid  advances  in  decreasing  infant  mortality  (see
Table 1)14. 
12 Through a multitude of different campaigns China made vigorous attempts to change
the attitude towards women during the Maoist era, 1949-197615. Started half-heartedly
in the mid-1950s  and mainly  touching urban areas,  China’s  birth control  campaign
resurfaced  in  the  early  1960s  then  halted  during  the  Cultural  Revolution  and  was
renewed in the 1970s. The two-child family ideal of the 1970s was in 1980 turned into
the one-child family promoted through a vigorous campaign. This coincided with the
de  facto  de-collectivisation  of  the  countryside  with  the  withering  away  of  the
rudimentary social safety net set up during the People’s Communes from 1958 onwards,
and a return to family agriculture. Hence the male line of the immediate family was
again left as the ultimate security for its members as it had been for the more than two
millennia of this patriarchal, patrilocal and patrilinial culture. 
13 Simultaneously with sons becoming even more valuable—both as workers in renewed
family agriculture and as future old-age support for peasants—new techniques of pre-
natal screening enabling sex selective abortions was introduced, contributing both to
hiding of births and abortion of female foetuses. 
14 A  substantial  number  of  births  since  1980  have  occurred  unreported.  One  report
mentioned a 33% undercount in Sichuan in 1981, and another 5% unreported in Jingan
county,  Shanghai16.  Underreporting has been one way of  avoiding forced abortions.
Chinese sources cite the amount of unreported births as one-third of all deliveries by
1990  and the  number  of  unreported  deaths  to  12% of  all  deaths17.  While  the  State
Statistics Bureau, for example, stated the number of births in China in 1998 to be 19.91
million, the State Family Planning Agency reported 13.83 million!18 
15 One survey reported that in Canton over three-quarters of all maternal deaths in the year
2000 involved women from the “floating population”, though this migrant population
made up less than one-third of the total population. An official inquiry showed that more
than half of these deaths were caused by insufficient medical care19. A report concluded,
“with  some  evidence  pointing  to  increased  maternal  mortality  among  migrant
populations as a result of lack of access to proper health care”20. As many of these deceased
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would-be mothers were trying to give birth secretly neither birth nor death of these
infants would have been registered. 
16 From 1953 until 1970, in regard to infant mortality according to sex, China followed a
general  Asian  and  also  global  trend  of  showing  a  higher  male  infant  mortality,  as
biologically the male sex is the weaker (see Table 2)21. However, after 1980 the Chinese
female infant mortality has been the higher. South Korea as well showed excess female
infant mortality in the 1980s22.  There is a significant marked discrimination against
daughters in South and East Asia,  though not in South-East Asia,  with Burma as an
example of this, nor the rest of the world23. A subsequent lower child mortality (age
group of 1-5 years) rate can therefore be a function of a high infant mortality rate (age
group  of  0-1  years),  meaning  those  meant  to  die,  either  by  nature  or  human
interference were already dead, which could explain that China was in 1997-2002 the
only country with a claimed child mortality rate below the age of ten where more girls
than boys were dying (see table 3). However, foreign demographers judge this to be an
under-evaluation24.  This  situation  stands  in  contrast  to  South-East  Asia  with  the
Philippines as an example of this (See Table 2)25. In South Asia, Sri Lanka became early
on an exception with a rapid reduction of infant mortality while the rest of South Asia
continued on a high level well into this millennium (see Table 1).
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Sex ratios among the youngest, 0-4 years old
17 How many men to 100 women there are on average in a population determines what is
called the sex ratio. This ratio is a function not only of the sex ratio at birth but also of
population growth, migration patterns by sex, life expectancy, and the general level of
mortality  (and  an  assumed  “gender”-neutrality  in  the  trends  of  mortality).  The
biological norm is about 105 boys born for every 100 girls and from there on the sex
ratio evens out. When comparing sex ratios globally those most distorted today are
overwhelmingly concentrated in Asia26.
18 Daughter  discrimination  is  normally  considered  a  practice  of  the  poor.  But  with
modern technology in the form of prenatal screening this has increasingly become an
urban middle-class phenomenon27.  Hence there could be no racial exceptions to this
norm,  as  sometimes  suggested  by  the  Chinese28.  From  1953  until  1980,  China’s
traditionally high sex ratio lowered somewhat, coinciding with a rudimentary social
safety  net  being set  up in rural  areas29.  When China reverted to  a  type of  tenancy
agriculture  in  the  early  1980s,  the  safety  net  set  up  under  the  collective  system
disintegrated  and  the  sex  ratios  of  children  aged  0-4  years,  rapidly  became  more
unbalanced (See Figure 4)30. 
19 Whatever misgivings people might have harboured about abortions as such were most
likely crushed by the severity of the application of the one-child-family policy with
forced abortions even as late as into the third trimester of pregnancy. Hence to abort a
foetus  of  the  “wrong”  sex  could  in  such  an  environment  be  seen  as  a  necessary
adjustment  to  the  prevailing  policy.  If  the  state  through  its  local  representatives
tampered with and forced the abortion of foetuses it would be hard to convince people
that they could not do the same according to their own preferences. The state had in
this case already lost the moral high ground in the eyes of the people, no matter what
official policy said, what counted was how this policy was implemented locally31.
20 According to most Chinese official data, the sex ratio among the youngest age cohort
0-4 years was 106 boys in China in the late 1950s until the late 1970s, and had risen to
120 in 2001 (see Figure 4), and was over 121 by 200332. However, in 2000 the sex ratio
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was only 105 in the 15 to 19 age cohort, born between 1981 and 1985. If the sex ratio of
that cohort when it was 0-4 years old in the early 1980s was 108 and later 105, that
would indicate that a number of girls had appeared from nowhere (meaning they had
never been registered) or, that so many had boys died thereby altering the sex ratio.
The latter scenario is not very likely given that the overall mortality rate by sex was
higher for girls. This would indicate how much caution must be employed when using
these estimates. 
21 Today China has the widest gap in the sex ratio among its youngest citizens in the
world (see Figure 4) 33, with some unforeseen consequences. In 1982, a survey revealed
that less than 1% of the women but 9% of the men aged 30-34 had never married. This
first age cohort of new China (born 1948-1952) reflected partly the lack of women in old
China34.
22 This serious situation is being recreated today as up to one-quarter of all young men
cannot find a wife, and is currently being called “a disaster more frightening than war”
35.
23 West China’s—Tibet, Xinjiang and Yunnan—have the most natural sex ratios while the
most industrialised parts along the southeast coast,  except Zhejiang province, show
skewed sex ratios. The most unfavourable are found in central south China (See Map 5).
The more Han Chinese the area is,  the less  girls  are allowed to live.  The one-child
policy,  which began in 1980 was at  first  not  enforced for  national  minorities,  then
eventually very cautiously, which might be part of the explanation. Another
explanation might be that couples of mixed marriages between a Han and a minority
who would earlier have chosen to register as Han, as this carried more benefits, were
registering less often as this allowed them to have more children when the one-child
policy was implemented36.
24 Although regional variations are great in China they are even more so in India (see Map
6).  The  regional  figures  for  India  clearly  demonstrate  a  severe  lack  of  girls  in  the
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northwest provinces, while the rest of India—and particularly the eastern and southern
areas—show more balanced sex ratios37. In 1981, Kerala’s ratio was 97, while it was 114
in Punjab and 115 in Haryana, the two latter states being more affluent38. Here again
wealth was no deterrent to heavier discrimination against females39. 
Missing young women 
25 All through recorded history, infants have been killed by their parents in emergency
situations. Europe, for example, has a long history of baby killing, institutionalised well
into the nineteenth century by “angel makers”40. In China, emperors and later modern
leaders have tried to outlaw infanticide41. Worldwide well over 100 million women are
currently  missing,  mainly  in  South  Asia  and  China  through  neglect,  infanticide  or
abortion42. One reason for this blaring sex discrepancy would be the low value accorded
to  daughters  expressed  in  the  selective  abortions—more  widely  available  from  the
1970s. 
26 All through Chinese and also Japanese recorded history, poor people used the age-old
method of selecting after the baby was born, which meant killing or abandoning a baby
girl43. From the 1980s on, more and more of the upper and middle classes, particularly
in China and in India, have resorted to selective abortion. Though forbidden by law,
this is widely practised showing up in distorted sex ratios at birth44. This means that
poverty as such would not be the driving factor, as used to be the standard explanation
for the traditional drowning of baby girls in imperial China. The rigid one-child policy
in China could be used as an explanation, but it applied only to urban areas. In rural
areas the one-child policy—later modified—has been complied with by about 1% of the
population and sex proportions are more distorted in rural areas than in urban ones45.
27 With the withering away of the state sector and its “Iron Rice Bowl”—the cradle-to-
grave safety net for workers—insecurity in old age has returned to urban China. Having
a son might be increasingly preferred for support in old age, although different kinds of
new, old-age reforms are under trial implementation46. 
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28 Son-preference  as  a  remnant  of  a  traditionally  patrilineal  society  could  be  an
explanation  for  this,  but  in  a  whole  generation,  with  collective  agriculture  and  a
rudimentary social safety net from the 1950s to the 1980s, this was not such a visible
phenomenon—the lowest sex ratios were recorded in the mid-1960s47.  The lack of a
social  security  net—particularly  for  old  age—in  rural  areas  could  be  closer  to  an
understanding of son-preference as daughters still marry out, while married sons are
considered responsible for their parents in old age, a finding that can be gathered from
local surveys48.  Hence at times rigid population policy by the government including
forced abortions combined with a favouring of the urban areas in social policy could be
part of an explanation, implying that when birth rates go or are forced down daughter
discrimination increases49.  This could mean that discriminatory social policy against
the  rural  population  as  such  could  be  one  main  cause  for  the  increasingly
disproportionate sex ratio in rural China. 
29 Citing a report from 2002 “Current government policies… generate migration through
extreme neglect of rural areas”50; and “…. China’s development policies which involve
the deliberate and systematic underdevelopment of rural areas”51.  Considering these
constraints then, the fatal discrimination of daughters for the individual rural family
might seem a rational solution in a situation where at least 90% of the rural population
have no pensions for old age52. As recent surveys of the elderly in China has shown that
even if son support is available most able-bodied old people in rural areas work—80% of
the men and half of the women in the formal sector until age 69, including 38% of the
seriously  ill.  All  the  elderly  who  were  childless  worked.  The  more  and  the  closer
parents lived with a son the less they worked and the better was their living standard.
Most  old  people  surveyed  worked  as  long  as  they  could  in  order  to  delay  their
dependence on a son until they really could no longer manage53.
30 As regards the current situation “the central authorities have balked at consolidating
pensions  into  a  national  framework  because  the  central  government  is  not  yet
prepared  financially  to  guarantee  the  old-age  incomes  of  urban  workers,  not  to
mention those of rural inhabitants”54. Even in the richest areas of China such as Canton,
pension coverage is too narrow and too small. Hence for the foreseeable future for the
majority of the population no real alternatives exist to almost “work till you drop” and
relying on your son55.
31 Calculating the missing young women according to a global standard—by comparing
societies with similar life expectancy and infant mortality rates—shows that urbanised
and  affluent  Taiwan,  South  Korea  and  Singapore  display  similar  patterns  of
discrimination though none has implemented anything other than mild and voluntary
family planning campaigns (see Table 7).  In these societies as well,  a  general social
security net for old age has not been a priority, although a beginning might be in the
making in Taiwan56. In Singapore the notion of filial piety was revived when a new law
was promulgated in 1995 on care for elderly parents. Heated debate ensued when it was
revealed that mainly elderly people dominated among the poor in Singapore in 2000
while the rest of society was getting wealthier. Even in rich and advanced Japan the
new premier  Koizumi  when taking  office  in  2001  acknowledge  rapid  ageing  of  the
population as one major problem facing society. 
32 In China, the vital role of sons for old age security can be regarded as one main cause of
fatal  discrimination  against  daughters.  In  India,  researchers  usually  attribute  the
increased materialism of the middle class—expressed in excessive dowry outlays and
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demands—to the killing of women, either as foetuses or as young brides (see Table 2).
These gross imbalances between the sexes do not show among the poorest groups in
India, where for necessity a woman’s economic contribution and therefore her value is
higher in the family57.
33 In South-East Asia with markedly less of a social security system for old age, but with a
bilateral kinship system—meaning parents on both sides are just as important—all the
different variables showing sex discrimination are of a different order and closer to the
trends of the rest of the world58. 
34 Hence mainly economic forces, but through the prism of culture—sons as support in old
age—contribute to the killing of the female foetus, infant, child and young bride in both
poor and affluent East and South Asia. 
35 Western  Europe  needed  more  than  a  century  to  develop  old  age  security  while
population ageing was slow. In Sweden, for example, it took 85 years for those aged 65+
to grow from 7% to 14% of the population, while in Japan it was 25 years. In China it is
projected to be 30 years, for South Korea 20 years and only 18 for Singapore59. Hence
the problems here are of a different magnitude. The demographic consequences of the
one-child policy will more likely lead to more elderly working in rural as well as urban
China in the future. If the notions of filial piety are weakening and not supplanted by
equivalent daughter support the foreseeable future indeed looks bleak for the elderly.
Will this lead to diminished daughter discrimination? Having a daughter born after the
early 1980s means that most likely, if she wants to, she can marry and have a child.
Having a son born at the same time could mean that even if he wants to, he might be
among that quarter of the young male surplus population that cannot find anyone to
marry, joining an army of predictably more than 50 million bachelors. 
36 Affluence  and  rapid  economic  growth  have  not  been  changing  the  demographic
imbalance  between the  sexes  in  East  Asia,  while  lack  of  this  was  earlier  used as  a
standard explanation for South Asia. In South and East Asia, women continue to fare
worse  than  men.  South-East  Asia,  however,  shows  a  much  more  favourable
demographic set-up for women. 
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37 China has made vigorous attempts to change the attitude towards women during the
Maoist era. But the political system seems to be of lesser importance while one main
economic factor stands out—the system of old age support—which, negotiated through
the prism of culture, leads to fatal daughter discrimination, as demographic variables
in different societies show. 
38 South and East Asian societies do have in common a one-sided leaning towards support
being provided by the son in old age, upheld by culture but perpetuated, even when
relatively  affluent,  by  lack  of  other  alternatives.  This  also  explains  the  seemingly
contradictory  phenomenon  that  when  nativity  decreases—seen  as  a  sign  of
modernisation—simultaneously  daughter  discrimination increases—seen as  a  sign of
backwardness. Rigid population planning does not in itself have to lead to daughter
discrimination, but combined with a culture where lack of realistic alternatives—except
son support in old age—are potentially a lethal cocktail for young women. 
39 However, even without compulsory birth planning and with relative affluence but with
a similar cultural set-up do young women experience fatal disadvantages illustrated by
Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea. No number of campaigns will change the lesser
value that society and parents bestow on them. As there exists a number of both richer
and poorer societies where these phenomena do not occur, the crucial variable seems
to be how old-age support is organised, or rather how can it be reorganised, be given
the priority it deserves, particularly in view of the rapid ageing of both the Japanese
and Chinese populations. 
NOTES
See United Nations Demographic Yearbook (UNDY), 1948, Table 26 for Singapore and for Hong Kong
pre-1949 refer to 1948 in UNDY, 1949/50 Table 27. For South Korea see UN, The World´s Women
Trends and Statistics, New York, 2000, Chart 3.3.
NOTES DE FIN
1. Amartya Sen, “More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing”, The New York Review,
December 20th 1990.
2. Elisabeth Croll, Endangered Daughters Discrimination and Development in Asia, London,
Routledge, 2000.
3. Gilles Pison, “Moins de naissances mais un garcon à tout prix : l´avortement sélectif
des filles en Asie” (Less births but a boy at any price: selective abortion of girls in Asia)
in Population et Sociétés, Paris, No. 404, September 2004, and Annika Danielsson,
Where Have All The Young Girls Gone?
China Perspectives, 57 | january - february 2005
10
“Mansöverskott besvärlig följd av Kinas befolkningspolitik” (Male surplus disturbing
result of Chinese population policy) TT, April 23rd 2004. See also TT-Reuters, “Kina
försöker få stopp på aborter av flickfoster” (China tries to stop abortions of female
foetuses), Peking, August 12th 2004, and Martin King Whyte, cited in Valerie M. Hudson
and Andrea M. den Boer, Bare Branches Security Implications of Asia Surplus Male
Population, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., London, 2004, p. 27, and Wang Qiangzhuang,
“China’s Population: Imbalance of Gender Proportions”, FBIS-CHI-98-042, February 11th
1998.
4. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, London, Oxford University Press, 1999.
5. Lawrence Haddad, “Women’s Status: Levels, Determinants, Consequences for
Malnutrition, Interventions, and Policy”, in Asian Development Review, Vol. 17, No. 1,
1999. 
6. Marina Thorborg, “Research on Women in the Chinese Economy” in Theoretical and
Methological Problems in Research on Women in developing Countries, No. 5/82, Women's
Research Centre in Social Sciences, Copenhagen, 1982, and Marina Thorborg, 
Identification of Priority Research Issues on Women in Asia and the Pacific - A Report on
Research and Research Organizations with Bibliography, SAREC Documentation, Stockholm,
1985 (1st edition), 1986 (2nd edition). See also Marina Thorborg, Chinese Women, An
Annotated Bibliography, Swedish International Development Authority, Stockholm, 1995. 
7. Stephanie Seguino, “Gender, quality of life, and growth in Asia 1970-90”, in The
Pacific Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2002. 
8. Thorborg, 1982, op. cit. 
9. Marina Thorborg, “Befolkningspolitik i Kina från Confucius till våra dagar”
(Population Policy in China from Confucius to today ), in Den Ny Verlden, Centre for
Development Research, Copenhagen, 1987/ 4.
10. Marina Thorborg, “Confidence, Corruption and Culture – The Role of Media in
Developing Civil Society”, in Ioan Horga & Renaud de Brosse (eds.), The Role of Mass-
Media and of the New Information and Communication Technologies in the Democratisation
Process of Central and Eastern European Countries, International Institute of Administrative
Studies, Bruxelles, 2002.
11. Marina Thorborg, “Comment on ‘China: End of Population Dynamics’” in PRC
Tomorrow: Development under the Ninth Five-Year Plan, National Sun Yat-Sen University,
Taiwan, 1996.
12. In regard to the countryside there exists a reinterpretation of the J. L. Buck survey
from 1929-31, but both the original and its later re-construction are open to dispute.
However Princeton demographers arrived at a rural infant mortality rate of some 30%.
See Judith Banister, China´s Changing Population, Stanford, Stanford University Press,
1987, pp. 3-7.
13. Dali L. Yang, Calamity and Reform in China State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change
Since the Great Leap Famine, Stanford University Press, 1996, and Jasper Becker, Hungry
Ghosts China´s Secret Famine, London, An Owl Book, 1996. See also Kenneth Hill,
Demographic Trends in China from 1950 to 1982, World Bank Discussion Papers 22, The
World Bank, Washington D.C., 1988.
14. Marina Thorborg, “Women under Maoism The Struggle to End Discrimination
Against and to Introduce Welfare for Women Workers”, in Cheng Ying et al. (eds.), 
Frauenstudien, Munchen, K.G. Saur Verlag, 1992. 
15. Ibid. See also Marina Thorborg, “Chinese Employment Policy in 1949-78 With
Special Emphasis on Women in Rural. Production”, in Chinese Economy Post-Mao, Joint
Where Have All The Young Girls Gone?
China Perspectives, 57 | january - february 2005
11
Economy Committee, Congress of the United States, November 1978, US Government
Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1978. 
16. Mary E. Young, André Prost, Child Health in China, World Bank Staff Working Papers,
No. 767, Washington D. C., 1985, pp. 5 ff. 
17. Thomas Scharping, Birth Control in China 1949-2000 Population policy and demographic
development, London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, Chap. 10-12. 
18. US Department of State, China, 2000, from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2000/eap/684.htm, March 21st 2003.
19. Human Rights in China, HRIC, “Institutionalized Exclusion: The tenuous legal status
of internal migrants in China’s major cities, A report by Human Rights in China”,
November 6th 2002.
20. “Institutionalized Exclusion”, China Rights Forum, No. 1, 2003.
21. While more female infants than male ones died in North China in the 1930s, the
reverse was true in south China. See Banister, 1987, Chap. 4, op. cit.
22. During the pre-war period in times of stress both Singapore and Hong Kong
recorded an excess of female infant mortality. In Singapore under the latter part of the
Japanese occupation during the Second World War there was a higher female than male
infant mortality rate. In 1944 and 1945 the female infant mortality rate was 295 and
222, respectively, compared to a male rate of 284 and 210, but after the occupation in
1946 it again reverted to a higher male infant mortality rate. Hong Kong too
experienced higher female mortality rates in 1948 and 1953, but neither city did later
revert to a higher female rate. (See Figure 1) Hence for Singapore in times of crises and
insecurity the traditional son-preference—whereby sons are a guarantee for care and
support in old age what also can be called fatal daughter discrimination—set in. The
same explanation would go for Hong Kong in the 1940s and the 1950s with a large
refugee population. 
RÉSUMÉS
This article looks at regional discrimination against daughters in China. To see where and why
this discrimination occurs, it considers a number of demographic variables, such as infant and
child mortality by sex as well as sex ratios of populations in East, South-East, and South Asia. It
refutes the idea that rigid population control is the main cause of skewed sex ratios. An amalgam
of cultural and economic factors are seen as the main contributing causes including a lack of
institutionalised old age support from the state and a culture that gives the main responsibility
for this to sons. 
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